Is This Necessary: An Analysis of the Court’s Relaxed Application of Anderson in Peters v. Johns by Hadlow, Aaron
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 83 
Issue 1 Winter 2018 Article 10 
Winter 2018 
Is This Necessary: An Analysis of the Court’s Relaxed Application 
of Anderson in Peters v. Johns 
Aaron Hadlow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aaron Hadlow, Is This Necessary: An Analysis of the Court’s Relaxed Application of Anderson in Peters v. 
Johns, 83 MO. L. REV. (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 NOTE 
Is This Necessary: An Analysis of the 
Court’s Relaxed Application of Anderson in 
Peters v. Johns 
Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) 
Aaron Hadlow* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, policing tactics have undergone increased public scru-
tiny as Black Lives Matter1 and other social activists have called attention to 
incidents where police officers have used lethal force.  Reports, such as the 
United States Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police De-
partment,2 have revealed deeply systemic policing practices that enforce pov-
erty among minority groups by means of racially-targeted policing practices 
and subsequent penalties.  Perhaps nowhere in the country are these issues 
more pressing upon the minds of voters than in the St. Louis, Missouri, com-
munity.  These issues are what motivated St. Louisan Rachel Johns to seek the 
Missouri House of Representatives’ seat for her North County community.  
These issues are what motivated her to engage a political system that she had 
long felt “failed her.”  Johns, as any who seeks to do the hard work of effecting 
positive community change, was met with adversity: Her candidacy was chal-
lenged because she failed to meet the formal election requirements of Mis-
souri’s Constitution.  The courts agreed with her challenger, and Johns was told 
 
*B.A., Philosophy, Missouri State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2018.   I extend my thanks to my wife and family for their con-
tinual support of my academic endeavors.  I am also grateful to my faculty advisor 
Professor Reuben and the members of the Missouri Law Review for their thoughtful 
feedback throughout the editing process. 
 1. Beginning as “[a] call to action,” the Black Lives Matter movement was 
formed as an activist organization that works to “creat[e] a world where black lives 
actually do matter” by encouraging social action to combat the violence inflicted on 
communities of color by “the state and vigilantes.”  Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: 
The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rights-
movement; About: Build Power, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmat-
ter.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). 
 2. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
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she must wait – wait to run until 2018, wait to pursue her and her supporters’ 
political objectives, and wait for the uncertain tides of political momentum to 
change, perhaps unfavorably. 
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s application of An-
derson v. Celebrezze in one of Missouri’s most recent candidacy requirement 
cases, Peters v. Johns.3  It argues that the court underappreciated the burden 
imposed on Johns by its two-year voter registration requirement.4   Part II dis-
cusses the facts and holding of Peters v. Johns.  Part III provides the legal 
background to help understand the court’s decision.  Part IV discusses the 
court’s reasoning in Peters v. Johns, while Part V argues for a more rigorous 
application of the Anderson test. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On February 4, 2015, Rachel Johns, a resident of the 76th District of the 
Missouri House of Representatives, registered to vote.5  In 2016, Johns de-
clared her candidacy for the Democratic Party’s nominee for the 76th District, 
which was to be decided during the August 2, 2016, primary.6  Johns filed the 
required paperwork with the Missouri Secretary of State’s Office.7  Johns 
stated under oath that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representa-
tive as required by Missouri’s Constitution.8 
Joshua Peters, the incumbent, was also running in the Democratic primary 
for the 76th District.9  Peters filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. 
Louis challenging Johns’s candidacy.10  Peters challenged Johns’s candidacy 
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute section 115.526 because she would not 
have been a registered voter for two years prior to the November 8, 2016, gen-
eral election.11  Peters argued that Johns, therefore, could not meet the two-
year durational voter registration requirement found in article III, section 4 of 
the Missouri Constitution.12  Article III, section 4 requires a candidate to be “a 
qualified voter for two years” prior to the date of the general election.13  Peters 
sought to have Johns removed from the Democratic primary ballot.14 
Johns argued that the durational voter registration requirement was con-
stitutionally invalid because its temporary disqualification of her candidacy 
 
 3. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 
262 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 4. See infra Part V. 
 5. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 265–66. 
 6. Id. at 266 & n.1. 
 7. Id. at 266. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 266 & n.2. 
 10. Id. at 266. 
 11. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 115.526 (2016). 
 12. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 266; see also MO. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 13. MO. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 14. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 266. 
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was a penalty for engaging in First Amendment protected “expressive 
speech.”15  Johns stated that she had not registered to vote because to do so 
“would mean endorsing a system that had continued to fail her community.”16 
Further, Johns argued that the durational voter registration requirement uncon-
stitutionally burdened her voting rights and the voting rights of the residents of 
her legislative district.17 
The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis held that the durational voter 
registration requirement did not constitutionally violate the First or Fourteenth 
Amendment.18  The circuit court ruled that Johns be removed from the primary 
ballot.19  Johns appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to 
the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions.20  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that (1) a “qualified voter” under article III, section 4 is 
a registered voter; (2) Johns failed to preserve at trial a Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection claim;21 (3) Johns’s failure to register as a voter did not qual-
ify as “expressive speech” under the First Amendment; and (4) article III, sec-
tion 4 requirements did not violate the voting rights of Johns or the voters in 
her legislative district.22 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The holding in Peters v. Johns requires an understanding of the court’s 
application of the First Amendment to the issues of symbolic speech, voting 
requirements, candidacy requirements, and associational rights.  Part A of this 
section overviews the history of Missouri’s voter registration requirements for 
candidacy.  Part B of this section briefly reviews judicial levels of scrutiny.  
Part C of this section outlines a few relevant cases on expressive conduct.  Part 
 
 15. Id. at 266, 270. 
 16. Id. at 270. 
 17. Id. at 266. 
 18. Id.  The court noted that the basis of its decision relies on the First and Four-
teenth Amendments and eschewed a “separate Equal Protection Clause analysis.”  Id. 
at 272 n.10.  But the court recognized its decision “necessarily relies . . . on the analysis 
of a number of cases applying the ‘fundamental rights’ strand of equal protection law.”  
Id. 
 19. See id. at 266. 
 20. Id. at 266 & n.3; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
 21. The court quickly disposed of this claim.  In doing so, it discussed the require-
ments of preservation.  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 269.  To preserve a constitutional chal-
lenge, Missouri courts have held that a party must: (1) raise the challenge at the earliest 
opportunity; (2) state with specificity the constitutional provision at issue; (3) support 
the challenge with facts showing a constitutional violation; and (4) preserve the ques-
tion throughout appellate review.  Id.; Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kan. City, 430 
S.W.3d 260, 266 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  The purpose for this rule is to allow the circuit 
court an opportunity to “fairly identify and rule on the issue.”  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 
269.  Given the court’s quick treatment of the claim, and the limited scope of arguments 
addressed here, this point is not addressed elsewhere in this Note. 
 22. Id. at 268–69, 271, 277–78. 
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D of this section discusses durational voter registration requirements and the 
impact of those requirements on (1) candidacy rights and (2) voter rights. 
A. The Meaning of a “Qualified Voter” 
Missouri Constitution article III, section 4 lays out the “qualifications of 
representatives.”23  Article III, section 4’s durational voter registration provi-
sion requires representatives to “be twenty-four years of age, and next before 
the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter for two years.”24  The 
legislature’s use of the words “qualified voter” dates back to Missouri’s 1875 
Constitution.25  Under the 1875 Constitution,26 other candidacy provisions sim-
ilarly had a durational “qualified voter” requirement.27  “Qualified voter” was 
also used to describe those entitled to vote.28 
The court first read “qualified voter” to mean “registered voter” in State 
ex. rel. Woodson v. Brassfield.29   In that case the court noted that if a law 
required registration, then a qualified voter was only one that had fulfilled the 
registration requirements.30   Notably, under Missouri’s 1875 Constitution, 
only white males twenty-one years of age or older were eligible for registration 
and thus, qualification.31  As voting rights expanded beyond the narrow class 
eligible32 under the court’s early interpretation of “qualified voter,” the court 
continued to reaffirm that “qualified voter” meant “registered voter.”33 
 
 23. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 24. Id. (emphasis added). 
 25. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 4 (1909). 
 26. Missouri’s 1875 Constitution became ineffective upon the ratification of the 
state’s 1945 Constitution.  Missouri’s case law describing the development of the def-
inition of “qualified voter” still relies, in part, on the 1875 provision.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Burke v. Campbell, 542 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
 27. See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 6 (1909) (state senators); see also id. 
art. VI, § 26 (circuit judges). 
 28. See MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2 (1909); id. art. IV, § 2; id. art. IV, § 5; 
id. art. VI, § 5; id. art. VI, § 25. 
 29. State ex rel. Woodson v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331 (1878). 
 30. Id. at 336. 
 31. See MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2 (1909). 
 32. Id. (“Every male citizen of the United States . . . who is over the age of twenty-
one years . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burke v. Campbell, 542 S.W.2d 355, 357–58 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1976); State ex rel. Mason v. Cty. Legislature, 75 S.W.3d 884, 887–88 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
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B.  Levels of Scrutiny 
There are generally three levels of scrutiny applied by a court when it 
reviews a state law or regulation that restricts constitutionally protected activ-
ity.34  Those three levels of scrutiny are (1) rational basis, (2) intermediate, 
interchangeably called “heightened,” and (3) strict scrutiny.  The level of scru-
tiny applied is determined by the constitutional right at issue.  If a court regards 
a right as more important or fundamental, then the court examines the purpose 
of the state restriction more closely.  Review under the rational basis test is the 
most deferential to state interests underlying a statute or regulation of constitu-
tionally protected activity.  A state restriction will be upheld under rational 
basis review if it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”35  Formu-
lations of the test applied for intermediate scrutiny vary, though generally 
courts balance the imposition of the restriction on the right at issue against the 
State’s “important or substantial” interest underlying the restriction.36  Finally, 
strict scrutiny requires the state restriction on constitutional rights be “narrowly 
tailored” to achieve a “compelling state interest.”37 
Under these tiers of review, the court often upholds state restrictions of 
individual rights when reviewed under rational basis.  Similarly, outcomes un-
der intermediate scrutiny review often favor state restrictions.38  Unlike rational 
basis and intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny often results in courts striking 
down state restrictions on individual rights.39 
C.  Symbolic Speech and Expressive Conduct 
The First Amendment protects “expressive conduct” as a species of “sym-
bolic speech.”40  But, a party asserting a free-speech claim must first “demon-
strate that the First Amendment even applies.”41  This burden of first demon-
stration may be met by showing that the conduct in question was expressive.42   
 
 34. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007). 
 35. Id. at 786. 
 36. Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
 37. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 & n.30 (2006). 
 38. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 818.  For example, in First Amendment cases “the 
lower courts’ analysis of cases in different areas of intermediate scrutiny is very con-
sistent – regardless of context, the government usually wins.”  Id. 
 39. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (coining 
the phrase that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). 
 40. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). 
 41. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5. 
 42. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
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Expressive conduct may trigger First Amendment protections when it is “suf-
ficiently imbued with elements of communication.”43 
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not disturb a lower court’s finding of expressive conduct when de-
monstrators sought to sleep on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., in struc-
tures constructed to symbolize the plight of the homeless.44  The Court upheld 
a National Park Service regulation, which prohibited overnight camping at the 
National Mall, on the basis of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.45  
In addressing the preliminarily issue whether conduct was expressive, and 
thereby warranting application of the First Amendment, the Court noted that 
“it is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive 
conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.”46  This ruling 
did not “deviate from the general rule that one seeking relief bears the burden 
of demonstrating that he is entitled to it.”47  Subsequent First Amendment anal-
ysis for expressive conduct is predicated on this initial showing.48 
The Supreme Court has given instructions on meeting this burden.49  One 
way to meet this burden is to show that conduct is “necessarily expressive.”50  
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 50 
U.S.C. § 462(b), which prohibited the willful or knowing destruction or muti-
lation of one’s Selective Service Registration Certificate.51  A Selective Service 
Registration Certificate is commonly known as a draft card.52  On March 31, 
1966, David O’Brien and three fellow protesters burned their draft cards on the 
steps of the South Boston Courthouse.53  The crowd that witnessed the event 
turned violent and O’Brien was escorted by an FBI agent inside the courthouse, 
where O’Brien was placed under arrest.54  O’Brien told the FBI agent that he 
burned his draft card in political protest.55  O’Brien also indicated his aware-
ness of 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)’s prohibition on such acts.56 
In analyzing O’Brien’s conduct under the First Amendment, the Court 
remarked that it could not “accept the view that an apparently limitless variety 
 
 43. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 
(1974)). 
 44. Clark, 468 U.S. at 291–93. 
 45. Id. at 294–95. 
 46. Id. at 293 n.5. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 293 (holding that a showing of expressive conduct sufficient to trigger 
First Amendment protections “only begins the inquiry”). 
 49. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 370. 
 52. Id. at 386. 
 53. Id. at 369. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the con-
duct intends thereby to express an idea.”57  The Court noted that conduct with 
a “communicative element” may warrant First Amendment protection, but 
when “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest” may permit the State 
to regulate the activity.58 
This application of heightened scrutiny59 justifies a regulation if “[the reg-
ulation] furthers an important or substantial governmental interest”; if that in-
terest “is unrelated to the suppression of free expression”; and if “the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.”60 
The Court found Congress to have “sweeping” power to raise and support 
armies.61  Further, Congress could establish a “system of registration for indi-
viduals liable for training and service, and may require such individuals within 
reason to cooperate in the registration system.”62  The Court held that any leg-
islation enacted to ensure “the continuing availability” of issued draft cards 
served a “legitimate and substantial purpose” because the draft cards served (1) 
as initial notice of registration and eligibility classifications, (2) as proof that 
the individual described on the card had in fact registered for the draft, (3) to 
facilitate communication between registrants and local draft boards, (4) as con-
tinual reminders of requirements imposed on the registrant to update infor-
mation with local boards, and (5) as notice of prohibitions against deceptive 
misuse of certificates including alteration or forgery.63  The Court also held 
that the regulation was narrowly drafted only to prevent “harm to the smooth 
and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System.”64  The Court distin-
guished the O’Brien restriction from others that specifically restricted “com-
municative element[s]” of expressive conduct, like a restriction punishing peo-
ple who expressed their opposition to organized government by displaying a 
flag or other symbol.65   The Court held that the O’Brien restriction was nar-
rowly tailored to regulate the “noncommunicative” elements of O’Brien’s con-
duct and any restriction on the “communicative” elements of O’Brien’s con-
duct was incidental.66 
While deciding O’Brien, the Court limited the scope of First Amendment 
protections for symbolic speech if the “incidental restriction” on free speech is 
 
 57. Id. at 376. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra Part III.B. 
 60. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 377–79. 
 64. Id. at 382. 
 65. Id.; see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (striking down 
a prohibition on displaying a Communist Party flag). 
 66. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
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“no greater than . . . essential” to further an “important or substantial” govern-
mental interest.67  The Court returned to the issue of symbolic speech in Texas 
v. Johnson, where it found a Texas flag-burning statute unconstitutional.68 
In Texas v. Johnson, the Court laid out the elements required for expres-
sive conduct to merit symbolic speech status.69  Texas passed a statute70 that 
prohibited the “desecration of a venerated object.”71  Gregory Lee Johnson par-
ticipated in a demonstration that culminated when Johnson “unfurled the 
American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire.”72  Johnson was 
charged, convicted, and sentenced to one year in prison and a $2000 fine.73 
In determining whether Johnson’s flag burning warranted First Amend-
ment protection as expressive speech, the Court asked whether Johnson acted 
(1) with “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and (2) whether “the 
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who 
viewed it.”74  The Court noted that the flag was central to Johnson’s conduct 
and that flags are “[p]regnant with expressive content.”75  Moreover, the con-
text of Johnson’s conduct was at a political demonstration.76  The Court con-
cluded that Johnson’s conduct was “intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,” 
therefore, “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”77 
The Court applied heightened – but not strict – scrutiny, and found that 
the interests of Texas in “preventing breaches of the peace” and “preserving 
the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” were insufficient to jus-
tify a restriction on Johnson’s expressive conduct.78  The Court emphatically 
held that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it 
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,” citing thirteen 
cases that supported its proposition.79 
In review, the Court’s rulings for expressive conduct as symbolic speech 
afford First Amendment protections under free-speech claims only when a 
 
 67. Id. at 377. 
 68. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
 69. Id. at 404. 
 70. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.09(a)(3) (1989), invalidated by Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
 71. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400. 
 72. Id. at 399. 
 73. Id. at 400. 
 74. Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 410–11 (1974)).  This is the test for expressive speech laid out by the Court in 
Spence v. Washington. 
 75. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405. 
 76. Id. at 406. 
 77. Id. (second quote quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409). 
 78. Id. at 407. 
 79. Id. at 414. 
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claimant meets its burden of first demonstration.80  This burden of first demon-
stration is met when a plausible contention is shown that the symbolic conduct 
in question is expressive.81  Symbolic speech satisfies expressiveness when it 
is sufficiently communicative, in that (1) it intends to convey a particularized 
message and (2) there is a great likelihood that the message will be understood 
by those who viewed it.82 
D.  Candidacy Requirements 
State regulation of elections has been the subject of U.S. Supreme Court 
review since as early as 1886.83  Importantly, the Court has discussed the im-
pact of state requirements for candidate filings and voting procedures.84 
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, an independent presidential candidate was 
barred from the general election ballot in Ohio after not meeting an early filing 
requirement for candidacy.85  Ohio required a filed statement of candidacy by 
a certain date.86  The candidate failed to file the statement of candidacy by the 
deadline but met all other requirements.87 
The Court noted the inseparability of candidates’ access to the ballot with 
the rights of voters.88  The Court recognized the necessity of regulating elec-
tions by reasoning that regulations ensure that the “democratic processes” are 
“fair and honest” and involve “some sort of order, rather than chaos.”89  This 
paramount state interest warranted a delicate balancing of “the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First . . . Amend-
ment[] that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate” against the identified and eval-
uated “precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.”90  The balancing test further required the Court to “not 
only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests” but also 
 
 80. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984). 
 81. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968). 
 82. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. 
 83. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 371 (1886) (noting “[i]t has accord-
ingly been held generally in the states that whether the particular provisions of an act 
of legislation establishing means for ascertaining the qualifications of those entitled to 
vote, and making previous registration in lists of such, a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the right, were or were not reasonable regulations, and accordingly valid or 
void, was always open to inquiry, as a judicial question”); see also Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (candidates’ rights); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 
(1992) (voters’ rights). 
 84. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (state requirements for candidate filings); Burdick, 
504 U.S. at 430 (voting procedures). 
 85. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 786. 
 89. Id. at 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 90. Id. at 789. 
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to “consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
[candidate’s] rights.”91 
In applying the “character and magnitude of the asserted injury” prong of 
its balancing test, the Court determined that ballot access to independent can-
didates for the presidency was “uniquely important” because the President and 
Vice President are the only elected officeholders who represent the nationwide 
electorate.92  Because of this unique importance, Ohio’s filing deadline “more 
than burden[ed] the associational rights of independent voters and candidates. 
It place[d] a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral pro-
cess.”93 
The Court then proceeded to the second prong of its balancing test, which 
required it to identify and evaluate the “precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”94  The second prong 
required the Court to not only determine the “legitimacy and strength” of the 
State’s interest but also the “extent . . . those interests make it necessary to 
burden the [candidate’s] rights.”95  The Court identified three state interests: 
voter education, equal treatment, and political stability.96  It ruled that the 
State’s voter education interest was “important and legitimate”; however, it did 
not justify the restriction to the presidential ballot imposed by the early dead-
line because “modern communications” allowed for more effective voter edu-
cation, while campaign spending indicated that most voter education occurred 
“largely during the month before an election.”97  The Court similarly found the 
State’s interest in equal treatment to be insufficient to justify burdening the 
candidate’s rights because independent candidates, unlike partisan candidates, 
do not participate in primaries and thereby do not have the same administrative 
concerns tied to “intraparty contest[s].”98  It also found the State’s interest in 
political stability an insufficient justification for the early deadline for inde-
pendent candidates.99  The Court held that Ohio’s deadline “for independent 
candidates for the office of President of the United States [was not] justified by 
the State’s asserted interest.”100 
Anderson’s focus was on candidates’ rights.101  In Burdick v. Takushi, the 
Court engaged in a similar analysis to that in Anderson but for voters’ rights.102  
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 794–95. 
 93. Id. at 795. 
 94. Id. at 789. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 796–806. 
 97. Id. at 796–97 (second and third quotes quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330, 358 (1972)) 
 98. Id. at 799–801. 
 99. Id. at 801–06. 
 100. Id. at 805–06. 
 101. It is important to again note, and the Court recognized, that candidates’ rights 
are inextricably bound with voters’ rights.  See id. at 786. 
 102. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438–39 (1992). 
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Burdick also illuminated the analysis required by “the extent to which those 
interests make it necessary to burden . . . rights” prong of the Anderson balanc-
ing test.103  The issue before the Court in Burdick was “whether Hawaii’s pro-
hibition on write-in voting unreasonably infringe[d] upon its citizens’ rights 
under the First . . . Amendment[].”104 
The Court rejected the contention that voting regulations are always sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest, because it “would tie the hands of States 
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”105  Ra-
ther, election efficiency and fairness are better achieved under a more “flexible 
standard.”106  That flexible standard, as applied in Burdick, was the Anderson 
balancing test.107  The Court fleshed out the Anderson test by distinguishing 
the classification of burdens to voter rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.108  If a challenged election regulation imposes a “severe” burden 
on voters’ rights, then the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a 
state interest of compelling importance.”109  But if an election regulation im-
poses only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon voters’ rights, 
then “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to jus-
tify” the regulation.110  Essentially, the Court ruled that if the burden is “se-
vere,” then strict scrutiny applies.111  But, if the burden imposed is reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory, and thereby de minimis, then an important state interest 
is sufficient to support the regulation.112  Before the Court proceeded to an 
analysis of the merits of Hawaii’s interest, it first engaged in this burden deter-
mination.113 
In doing so, the Court reiterated that the voters’ rights at issue114 were 
inseparable from candidacy rights.115  It then found that Hawaii’s write-in bal-
lot prohibition only limitedly burdened the rights at issue because the prohibi-
tion was found to be “reasonable” and it did not require voters to “espouse 
positions that they do not support,” but rather it “require[d] them to act in a 
timely fashion” in accordance with ballot access regulations to ensure the can-
didate of their preference is on the ballot “if they wish to express their views 
 
 103. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 104. Id. at 430. 
 105. Id. at 433–34. 
 106. Id. at 434. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 110. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
 111. Id. (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 434–39. 
 114. The voting rights identified were the right of expression and association with 
the candidate of the voter’s choice.  Id. at 430. 
 115. See id. at 434–35. 
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in the voting booth.”116  This finding of a limited burden triggered lesser scru-
tiny.117 
The Court then identified Hawaii’s precise interests, which justified the 
burden imposed by the State’s prohibition on write-in candidates.  Those inter-
ests were (1) “avoid[ing] the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the gen-
eral election,” and (2) “guard[ing] against ‘party raiding.’”118 
Under (1), the Court reasoned that Hawaii was “within its rights to reserve 
‘[t]he general election ballot . . . for major struggles . . . [and] not a forum for 
continuing intraparty feuds.’”119  A prohibition on write-in candidates “is a le-
gitimate means of averting divisive sore-loser candidacies.”120 
Under (2), the Court defined “party raiding” as the “organized switching 
of blocs of voters from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome 
of the other party’s primary election.”121  The Court reasoned that Hawaii’s 
electoral process could be “circumvented in a party primary election by mount-
ing a write-in campaign for a person who had not filed in time or who had never 
intended to run for election.”122  Further, Hawaii’s electoral process could be 
“frustrated at the general election by permitting write-in votes for a loser in a 
party primary or for an independent who had failed to get sufficient votes to 
make the general election ballot.”123  The Court held that the write-in ban was 
a “reasonable way of accomplishing” these goals.124 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Part A of this section discusses the majority’s instant decision in Peters 
v. Johns authored by Judge Mary R. Russell.  Part B of this section discusses 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith’s dissenting opinion. 
A.  Majority Instant Decision 
The Supreme Court of Missouri approached the issues in Peters v. Johns 
by first deciding the meaning of “qualified voter” as included in article III, 
section 4.125  The court held that the meaning of “qualified voter” is to be un-
derstood as a registered voter because all jurisdictions require registration to 
 
 116. Id. at 438. 
 117. See id.. 
 118. Id. at 439 (first alteration in original) (first quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers 
Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986), then quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 
479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986)). 
 119. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 
(1974)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983)). 
 122. Id. at 440. 
 123. Id.   
 124. Id. 
 125. Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 266–67 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
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vote.126  This was not always the case in Missouri.127  Under Missouri’s 1875 
Constitution, a qualified voter included “all those who could appear at the polls 
and vote on election day.”128  Registration was required only for the most pop-
ulous areas.129  But with the adoption of the 1945 Constitution, Missouri incor-
porated an understanding that a “qualified voter” was any registered voter 
“when and where registration is required.”130  Because Missouri now requires 
registration to vote in all of its legislative districts, a “qualified voter” can only 
be a registered voter.131  Under this reading, Johns could not be a “qualified 
voter” for the required duration in any sense that meets article III, section 4 
requirements because she was not registered two years prior to the date of the 
general election.132 
The court then held that Johns’s failure to register to vote did not invoke 
First Amendment protection when she intentionally did not register to avoid 
“endorsing a system that had continued to fail her community.”133  The court 
held that Johns’s asserted free speech claim did not trigger First Amendment 
protections when she could not show that her intentional failure to register was 
sufficiently communicative.134  Johns’s failure to register was not sufficiently 
communicative because she could not show that it was intended to convey that 
she did not endorse a political system that failed her community and that there 
was any likelihood her failure to register would have been understood as a po-
litical statement.135  The court found Johns “[did] not assert that anyone viewed 
[her] voter registration records and observed her absence therefrom,” nor did 
she “allege that she told anyone that she intentionally did not register,” as an 
act of political protest.136  The court concluded that under these conditions 
“there [was] simply no basis” to hold that Johns’s failure to register was “any 
different from anyone else’s failure to register simply out of neglect or indif-
ference.”137 
The court then held that article III, section 4 did not violate Johns’s can-
didacy or voting rights by requiring that Johns register a full two years prior to 
the date of the general election in which she sought ballot access.138  The court 
applied the Anderson balancing test.139  In assessing the character and magni-
tude of the asserted injury to Johns, the court found that article III, section 4’s 
 
 126. Id. at 268. 
 127. Id. at 267. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 268. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 270–71. 
 134. Id. at 271. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 277. 
 139. Id. at 271–72. 
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regulation on voter registration invoked (1) Johns’s right to ballot access and 
(2) First Amendment associational rights of voters in her district.140 
Following Burdick, the court reasoned that it was “the severity of the bur-
den on the asserted constitutional rights that produces the level of scrutiny.”141  
The court found that for Johns’s right to ballot access there was only a de min-
imis burden imposed by article III, section 4 where it (1) affected a non-funda-
mental right; (2) only delayed her candidacy, not prevented it; and (3) applied 
to any “putative candidate for state representative, regardless of economic sta-
tus or political affiliation.”142  The court then held that given the de minimis 
burden, rational basis scrutiny applied.143 
Under rational basis scrutiny, the court weighed the identified magnitude 
and character of injury to Johns’s right to ballot access against the proffered 
interests of Missouri in article III, section 4 requirements.144  The court recog-
nized Missouri’s interest in “protecting the integrity of [its] electoral systems 
from frivolous candidacies” to ensure that “election processes are efficient, and 
[to] avoid[] voter confusion caused by an overcrowded ballot.”145  Further, the 
court recognized that Missouri has an interest in “encouraging candidates to 
show a level of commitment to the electoral process and exhibit meaningful 
social engagement and interest in Missouri civic affairs.”146  The court rea-
soned that article III, section 4 requirements were a reasonable means of ad-
dressing these interests because they “ensure[] that a prospective legislator has 
taken the minimal steps necessary to be entitled to participate in the electoral 
process.”147 
Turning to the First Amendment associational rights of voters in Johns’s 
district, the court held that the burden on voters in Johns’s district was similarly 
de minimis when article III, section 4’s nondiscriminatory application did not 
impact the right of voters to vote but rather “only temporarily delays their abil-
ity to vote for Johns.”148  Under this determination, the court reasoned, rational 
basis applied.149  In balancing the injury to voters against Missouri’s interest in 
election fairness, and recognizing that “candidates for state representative 
demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and 
civic engagement,” the court held article III, section 4 to be a reasonable 
method for achieving Missouri’s interests.150 
 
 140. Id. at 272–73. 
 141. Id. at 273 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
 142. Id. at 274–75. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 274–77. 
 145. Id. at 275. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 276. 
 148. Id. at 277. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 277–78. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/10
2018] IS THIS NECESSARY 185 
B.  Judge Stith’s Dissent 
Judge Stith concurred with the majority opinion regarding Johns’s First 
Amendment claim that article III, section 4 violated her free speech rights.151  
However, Judge Stith dissented from the majority view that article III, section 
4 did not violate Johns’s First Amendment rights and the rights of the voters in 
the 76th District.152 
Judge Stith argued that the court must engage in a full application of the 
Anderson test to determine the burden imposed on Johns’s right.153  This de-
termination requires a full consideration of the injury to Johns’s right against 
the State’s interests supporting the voter registration requirement.154  Accord-
ingly, Judge Stith reasoned that “[i]f the [State’s] interest is minimal or the 
necessity of imposing the burden questionable, then the burden is more likely 
to be substantial than where the interest protected is high and its connection to 
and the necessity for the burden to protect that interest is great.”155  Only after 
engaging in this first burden determination can the court determine the scrutiny 
level to be applied.156 
Judge Stith argued that the majority failed to engage in this analysis “in 
context.”157  Stith’s Anderson analysis “in context” would have the court, in-
stead, consider both the State’s interests alongside Johns’s injury and the ne-
cessity of the requirement, then proceed to a scrutiny determination.158  This 
stands in contrast to the majority’s approach, which determined the burden in 
the “abstract” by only considering the rights at issue, foregoing an evaluation 
of the State’s underlying interest and the necessity of the registration require-
ment.159 
Judge Stith further argued that an Anderson analysis “in context” would 
have resulted in a substantial burden determination, rather than the majority’s 
de minimis determination.160  This difference would have resulted in an appli-
cation of strict scrutiny, rather than the majority’s application of rational basis 
 
 151. Id. at 278 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id.  Judge Breckenridge and Judge Teitelman joined Judge Stith in dissent.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 279. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  Assumedly, under this approach the emphasis of the Anderson factors 
would lie in the interrelation of the injury, the interests, and the necessity of the require-
ment.  On its face, this seems to suggest that the court should consider each factor twice.  
Once to make a burden determination and thereby decide which level of scrutiny is 
applicable, and then again when considering whether the rights and regulations suffi-
ciently met the Anderson factors in their contextual application to the proper level of 
scrutiny.  See id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 279–80. 
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review.161  Under strict scrutiny, a “restriction [must] be narrowly drawn to 
advance a state interest of compelling importance.”162  In Judge Stith’s view, 
Missouri’s voter registration requirement was not supported by a sufficiently 
compelling state interest; therefore, the restriction should not disqualify 
Johns’s candidacy.163 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part argues that (A) the majority opinion underappreciated the “char-
acter and magnitude” of the injury to Johns’s First Amendment right, (B) the 
court over-appreciated the “legitimacy and strength” of the State’s interests that 
support the voter registration requirement, and (C) the court over-appreciated 
the necessity of the voter registration requirement.164 
A.  The Majority Opinion Underappreciates Johns’s Injury 
The Anderson balancing test requires the court to first identify “the char-
acter and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate.”165  In Pe-
ters v. Johns, the court identified two constitutional rights at issue: (1) Johns’s 
candidacy rights and (2) voter associational rights under the First Amend-
ment.166  In evaluating Johns’s candidacy rights, the court framed the burden 
imposed as de minimis because (1) article III, section 4 placed a “minimal de-
lay” on Johns’s candidacy; (2) the provision was nondiscriminatory; and (3) 
the right to run for office was not a fundamental liberty interest.167 
The following subparts address Johns’s candidacy rights because any in-
jury that burdens Johns’s candidacy rights necessarily imputes upon the rights 
 
 161. Id. at 280. 
 162. Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 
(1992)). 
 163. See id. at 282. 
 164. While equally worthy of consideration, this note does not fully examine the 
injury to the voters’ First Amendment associational rights because of Johns’s removal 
from the ballot.  Nor does it consider the court’s refusal to reach the First Amendment 
issue of Johns’s failure to register to vote as symbolic speech.  While not at issue in this 
case, there is a problematic failure of liberal free speech principles to protect the rights 
of women and minorities.  See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); SPEECH AND HARM: 
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 
2012); Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of 
a Free Speech Principle, 23 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 343 (2010). 
 165. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 166. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 272. 
 167. Id. at 274–75. 
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of voters, as recognized by the interrelated nature of the rights in Burdick.168  
Since voters’ rights have greater protection, as a recognized fundamental lib-
erty interest, if a lesser protected candidacy right is violated, then the right of 
the voters to cast a ballot for that candidate would also be burdened.  With that 
in mind, this section is broken into two parts: Part 1 addresses the court’s un-
derappreciation of the injury imposed on Johns by the delay, and Part 2 ad-
dresses the court’s underappreciation that the voter registration requirement 
applies in a nondiscriminatory way. 
1.  The Court Underappreciates the Injury Imposed on Johns by a Delay in 
Candidacy 
The court reasoned that because Johns is now registered to vote, she is 
only temporarily delayed from being a candidate and that this temporary delay 
is only a nominal injury.169  The court relied on two cases to support this ra-
tionale, both of which are distinguishable from the instant case.170  One in-
volved a challenge to a minimum age requirement.171  The other case chal-
lenged a requirement for completing a term of office before assuming a second 
elected role.172 
A challenge to a minimum age requirement is different from a voter reg-
istration requirement because a minimum age requirement applies to nearly 
every facet of public life as a safeguard against immaturity and, in some cases, 
ensures that sufficient biological developments have occurred so that the reg-
 
 168. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (noting that “[e]lection laws will 
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters”). 
 169. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 274–75. 
 170. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260 (8th 
Cir. 1990).  Judge Stith’s dissent explains why these two cases are distinguishable.  Pe-
ters, 489 S.W.3d at 281–82 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The candidate requirement at issue 
in Clements barred sitting officeholders from running for other elected positions until 
the officeholder concluded his or her term in office.  Clements, 457 U.S. at 960.  Judge 
Stith distinguished the State’s legitimate concern as not relevant to Missouri’s concern 
because the State’s concern in Clements was that candidates would neglect their pre-
sent-office responsibilities while engaging in campaign activities.  Peters, 489 S.W.3d 
at 281–82 (Stith, J., dissenting).  Johns was not a current officeholder; thus, the concern 
in Clements did not apply.  Stiles is distinguishable because the candidate requirement 
at issue was a minimum age requirement.  Stiles, 912 F.2d at 261–62, 265–66; Peters, 
489 S.W.3d at 282 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The Stiles court reasoned that age correlates 
with maturity, and thus the State’s concern that candidates have a minimum level of 
maturity, by way of reaching a certain age, was sufficiently related.  Stiles, 912 F.2d at 
267–68. 
 171. Stiles, 912 F.2d at 261–62. 
 172. Clements, 457 U.S. at 966–67. 
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ulated activity is safer for the participant – for example, driving license require-
ments,173 alcohol and tobacco sales,174 and contractual capacities.175  Even can-
didacy minimum age requirements are undergirded by these considerations, 
and barring premature death, everyone will inevitably eclipse the minimum 
age.  Minimum age requirements are warranted because their underlying ra-
tionales are more substantial and more closely related to the State’s concern 
due to the close scientific correlation between age and maturity.176  Discussed 
more fully infra,177 Missouri’s proffered interests that purportedly justify a 
voter registration requirement include (1) ensuring that candidates demonstrate 
a minimal level of civic engagement and (2) winnowing the field of frivolous 
candidacies.  Each tenuously support the State’s interest in maintaining orderly 
elections.  Denying an eighteen-year-old, whose biological development is not 
yet fully complete, access to buy alcohol, or even access to a state legislative 
ballot, is distinguishable from denying a long-term resident of Missouri and 
community activist access to the ballot. 
In light of the State’s questionable interests, a more obvious reason that a 
voter registration requirement imposes a more significant harm than the court 
credits is that Johns sought to run in the 2016 election, rather than some other 
election.178  Denied access to the ballot is significantly injurious because the 
social and political factors at play during any election are unique and factor 
into a candidate’s decision to enter a race.179  The issues that press upon the 
minds of the voters when considering candidates in the ballot box vary from 
election to election.  The political machinery, which increasingly determines 
election outcomes, coalesces behind candidates based on these issues.  In short, 
timing in elections is everything.  Johns registered to vote in the wake of social 
 
 173. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.178 (2016). 
 174. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.325 (Cum. Supp. 2017) (alcohol sales); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 407.933 (2016) (tobacco sales). 
 175. MO. REV. STAT. § 431.055 (2016). 
 176. See Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise 
and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 216, 219 (2009) (discussing the important relationship between the develop-
ment of the prefrontal cortex and judgment and decision making). 
 177. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 178. Political scientists have long recognized the importance of timing in elections.  
See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Timing of Elections, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 37, 43 (2010) (“The ability to exclude parties or candidates from ballots, to regu-
late who may vote, and to determine the way in which those votes are tallied are stand-
ard tools for influencing the outcomes of democratic elections.”); see also Walter J. 
Stone & L. Sandy Maisel, The Not-So-Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. 
House Candidates’ Nomination and General Election Prospects, 65 J.  POL. 951 (2003) 
(discussing generally the careful consideration of candidate entry into election races). 
 179. See Gordon S. Black, A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the 
Role of Structural Incentives, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144, 144–45 (1972); see also 
JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER, AMBITION AND POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 6, 9 (1966) (discussing ambition theory in the context of politicians seeking 
office). 
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protests in her community.180  The issues for which she advocated were unique 
to a political movement, of which the supporting tide may shift with future 
elections.  Ironically, Johns answered the call to civic engagement only to be 
told that she was not qualified because she was not sufficiently civically en-
gaged.181  
2.  The Court Underappreciates the Discriminatory Nature of the Voter 
Registration Requirement 
The court underappreciates the disparate impact of a voter registration 
requirement on the class of those denied the right of suffrage because they were 
“adjudged incapacitated, incarcerated, on probation or parole after commission 
of a felony, or convicted of a crime.”182 
The devastating effect of mass incarceration on communities of color is 
undeniable.183  Black neighborhoods in St. Louis have been especially affected 
by a regime of discriminatory policing practices and an application of a statu-
tory scheme that disproportionately penalized black residents over white resi-
dents.184  Johns sought to address these very issues by running for office.185  
While Johns herself was not subject to disenfranchisement because of laws that 
strip those convicted of felonies of their right to vote, some who might have 
supported her are barred from voting because of their felony convictions.  
These statutes are vestiges of a legal regime intended to prevent individuals of 
color from voting as well as to dilute support for candidates running to address 
issues affecting communities of color.186  This disenfranchised class is also 
barred from running for office.  While the court was certainly aware of the 
effect of voter registration requirements on potential candidates, and perhaps 
 
 180. Appellant’s Brief at 1–2, Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262 (Mo. 2016) (en 
banc) (No. SC 95678). 
 181. Similarly, the court arrived at a de minimis burden analysis for the voters’ 
rights at issue.  The court reasoned along the same lines that the burden on the voters 
is only temporary in that voters are not denied the right to vote for Johns in future 
election.  Instead, voters are merely denied the right to vote for Johns in 2016; therefore, 
only a de minimis burden existed.  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 277. 
 182. Id. at 274 n.15. 
 183. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incar-
ceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing 
the impact of mass imprisonment on community networks, social norms, citizenship 
and franchise, labor market exclusion, and enforced civic isolation). 
 184. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 2, at 42. 
 185. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 180, at 1–2. 
 186. Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domi-
nation”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 
109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 563 (2003) (“Felon voting restrictions were the first widespread 
set of legal disenfranchisement measures that would be imposed on African-Ameri-
cans, although violence and intimidation against prospective African-American voters 
were also common . . . .”). 
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there is wisdom in not permitting those convicted of felonies to enter the pol-
icy-making arena, the court cannot fairly say that voter registration require-
ments are nondiscriminatory in application considering commonly known so-
ciological facts.187 
B.  The Court Over-Appreciates the State’s Interests and the Re-
striction Is Not Necessary 
The voter registration requirement under article III, section 4 reveals itself 
as a substantial burden when considering Missouri’s interest supporting the 
provision and the (lack of) necessity of the requirement.  The court discussed 
two interests that Missouri had in a voter registration requirement: (1) to protect 
the electoral integrity from “frivolous candidacies” and (2) to require that can-
didates demonstrate a minimal level of civic engagement and commitment to 
Missouri’s electoral process.188 
As the court recognized, the State’s interest in preventing frivolous can-
didacies and voter confusion need not be supported by a “particularized show-
ing” of actual “voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivo-
lous candidacies” prior to the imposition of a “reasonable restriction[] on ballot 
access.”189   Important to the court’s argument is its qualification of restrictions 
on ballot access as “reasonable.” 
A restriction on ballot access must be “justified by a legitimate interest” 
and the restriction must be a “reasonable way of accomplishing this goal.”190  
For Missouri’s voter registration requirement to be reasonable, it must accom-
plish the State’s goal of protecting electoral integrity from “frivolous candida-
cies.”  As a policy, Missouri should cautiously review restrictions that aim to 
decide what makes a candidate “frivolous” because the “impact of candidate 
eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights.”191  A 
determination of “frivolity” seems difficult, if not impossible, for the State to 
achieve because it is entirely subjective, beholden to the individual or group of 
individuals making the determination.  Many may have considered our sitting 
 
 187. One out of every thirteen African Americans of voting age cannot vote because 
of felony conviction disenfranchisement statutes.  CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., STATE-
LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 at 1–
2 (July 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/State-
Level-Estimates-of-Felon-Disenfranchisement-in-the-United-States-2010.pdf.  This 
rate is four times greater than non-African Americans, where nearly 7.7% of the adult 
African American population is disenfranchised compared to 1.8% of the non-African 
American populations.  Id.; see also JEAN CHUNG, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A 
PRIMER (Jan. 2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/08/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf (presenting same). 
 188. Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 275 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).  
 189. Id. at 275 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95 
(1986)). 
 190. Id. at 273 (citing Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 191. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 788 n.9 (1983). 
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President a frivolous candidate at the outset of his campaign.  It seems unrea-
sonable that whether a person be registered (or not) to vote for any period 
would be an indicator of “seriousness” or “frivolousness” but rather an indica-
tor of whether one intends to vote – and given abysmal voter turnout rates, even 
this is questionable.  Additionally, as Judge Stith noted in her dissent,192 Mis-
souri does not require a minimal period of voter registration for positions of 
higher office.193  For example, Johns would have qualified to run for Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and State Auditor 
without registering to vote.194  Should it be assumed that the State does not care 
to ensure that officeholders of these positions are civically engaged and com-
mitted to Missouri’s electoral process?  Perhaps it could be argued that, prac-
tically speaking, to successfully wage a state-wide campaign for one of these 
positions, a candidate surely would have already held an elected office.  But 
recent trends suggest that demonstrated prior civic engagement and commit-
ment to the electoral process is neither an important consideration for voters 
nor a necessary requirement for ensuring that serious candidates receive the 
due attention and focus of voters.195  That durational voter registration require-
ments are not required indicium of “seriousness” or “frivolity” for these higher 
offices strongly suggests that the restriction is unreasonable. 
Nor does a voter registration requirement reasonably accomplish the 
State’s interest that candidates demonstrate a minimal level of civic engage-
ment and commitment to Missouri’s electoral process.  As the dissent notes, 
only one-third of registered voters even vote at all, much less demonstrate civic 
engagement beyond voting in major elections.196  With such abysmal turnout 
rates in elections, it can hardly be said that being a registered voter indicates 
even the barest level of civic engagement.  Thus, a durational voter registration 
requirement seems a poor indicator of civic engagement.  As Judge Stith rea-
soned in her dissent: 
 
     192.  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 284 (Stith, J., dissenting).  
 193. For example, the only qualifications to run for governor are that the candidate 
be at least thirty-five years old, a citizen of the United States, and a resident of Missouri 
for ten years prior to the election.  MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 194. See id. (governor); MO. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (lieutenant governor); MO. 
CONST. art. VII, § 8 (attorney general, secretary of state, and state auditor). 
 195. See, e.g., Zachary Crockett, Donald Trump Is the Only US President Ever with 
No Political or Military Experience, VOX (Jan. 23, 2017, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13587532/donald-trump-no-ex-
perience (“Trump’s lack of public service is part of the ‘outsider’ appeal that may have 
contributed to his success: Polls have shown that most Americans, especially Trump 
supporters, distrust the government.”); see also Jason Hancock, Political Newcomer 
Eric Greitens Defeats Democrat Chris Koster in Missouri Governor Race, KAN. CITY 
STAR (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-govern-
ment/election/article113266403.html (discussing Governor Eric Greitens’s platform to 
clean up Jefferson City politics). 
 196. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 283 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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Why is registration any more relevant to guaranteeing a committed 
and civic-minded representative than would be other far stronger indi-
cators of public mindedness, such as testifying about public issues, 
demonstrating for or against public issues of the day, being active in the 
League of Women Voters, working for a candidate for election, or any 
of a dozen other indicators of civic pride and interest?197  
In comparison, such a poor indicator cannot be called reasonable, espe-
cially when there are other, better indicators of civic engagement; perhaps none 
of which are better than actually running for office and fulfilling all the sub-
stantial requirements to do so. 
Under these considerations, the court appears to have over-appreciated 
the State’s interest supporting article III, section 4.  It also neglected to ade-
quately consider Anderson’s tailoring requirement, which requires the court to 
“consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
[candidate’s] rights.”  But under Anderson’s tailoring requirement, it is hardly 
clear that the voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 is “neces-
sary” to achieve Missouri’s interests in maintaining electoral integrity. 
A narrow definition of Anderson necessity would require that the state 
interest be achieved by no other means.  If the State wishes to winnow the field 
to only serious candidates, is winnowing not already achieved by the other re-
quirements of article III, section 4?198  Article III, section 4’s residential re-
quirements ensure that the candidate is part of the community that she seeks to 
represent, while the provision’s minimum age requirement further winnows the 
field to those who have matured to twenty-four years old, giving individuals 
ample opportunity to learn a trade or complete a program of post-secondary 
education. 
A broader interpretation of Anderson’s tailoring requirement might be 
satisfied if Missouri’s interests were achieved by the restriction, even if there 
were better means of achieving the interest or if some other restriction already 
accomplished the stated interest.  But under this broad interpretation, the mean-
ing of “necessary” seems to be impoverished.  Necessary is defined as “abso-
lutely needed” or “required.”199  How could a restriction that is not absolutely 
needed be in any sense “necessary” when it is already achieved by other re-
strictions? 
The State’s interest in requiring candidates to demonstrate a minimal 
level of civic engagement and commitment to Missouri’s electoral process is 
even less necessary than its winnowing rationale.  There is no logical necessity 
in the relationship between the registered voter and that voter’s civic engage-
ment.  As mentioned, scores of registered voters never make it to the polls, 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 4.  Article III, section 4 also requires candidates be 
at least twenty-four years old and a one-year resident of the legislative district in which 
they seek election.  Id. 
 199. Necessary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/necessary (last updated Mar. 23, 2018). 
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while many volunteer in the community and advocate politically without ever 
casting a ballot.  With such little civic engagement in the electoral process to 
begin with, it seems counterintuitive to discourage candidates who are recently 
moved to civic engagement.  Candidates animated by recent events will repre-
sent the very issues that press upon the minds of voters at the ballot box. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Anderson test requires the court to balance “the character and mag-
nitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First . . . Amend-
ment[] that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate” against the identified and eval-
uated “precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.”200  The balancing test further requires the court to “not 
only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests,” but also 
it must “consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to bur-
den the [candidate’s] rights.”201  In this analysis of Johns’s rights, the court 
underappreciated the character and magnitude of the injury imposed by article 
III, section 4.  It also over-appreciated the validity of the State’s interests and 
the necessary extent by which the regulation accomplished those interests.  
These misappraisals resulted in a de minimis burden determination, resulting 
in an application of rational basis review.  If the court applied Anderson more 
rigorously, then it may have deemed the burden imposed by the requirement 
substantial, thereby warranting an application of strict scrutiny.  Application of 
strict scrutiny would have likely invalidated the voter registration requirement 
under article III, section 4.  Johns would have then likely remained on the No-
vember ballot, where she may or may not have won the election.  Her opponent 
was the incumbent, and she faced an uphill political battle.  Regardless, voters 

















 200. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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